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work has shown how an approach based on adaptation can solve this problem,
giving a conceptually simple two-dimensional measure of ‘organismality’.Stuart A. West1 and E. Toby Kiers2
T.S. Kuhn famously divided scientific
progress into two stages [1]: first, there
are the periods of scientific revolution
or paradigm shift, when existing ideas
are replaced with radically different
ones; second, there are periods of
‘normal’ science, when all scientists
work within an accepted paradigm,
using it to solve puzzles. Contrary to
Creationist efforts to publicise the
contrary, evolutionary biology is in a
period of normal science and puzzle
solving. Even in normal periods,
however, new ideas can be born that
greatly alter your perspective on
particular issues, challenging previous
dogmas, or even making you
appreciate a problem where you
thought there was none: Queller and
Strassmann’s [2] recent reassessment
of the organism is a good example.
Amongst biologists, there has been
a lack of agreement on exactly what
is required to make something an
organism [3,4]. A common approach
to defining an organism is to consider
things that clearly are organisms, and
to then determine the attributesmaking
them what they are. This has led to
a focus on characteristics such as
indivisibility (if you cut an organism
in half it cannot function) and genetic
uniqueness (there is only one of each
organism) [5]. The problem is that such
approaches are heavily based on
animal attributes; definitions become
more slippery with smaller or more
obscure taxa [2]. Furthermore, it is
now appreciated that most of the
major evolutionary transitions have
relied upon previously independent
groups of individuals coming together
to form larger units, for example,
replicators in chromosomes, cells in
multi-cellular organisms, and workers
within the eusocial insects [6,7]. Can
and do ‘organisms’ occur at all of these
evolutionary levels?
Queller and Strassmann [2] make
adaptation, the seemingly ‘goal-
directed’ process, the key aspect in the
definition of an organism. The problem
of adaptation is explaining why distinct
parts of an organism appear contrivedas if for the same purpose — namely
how the growth, development and
reproduction of that organism (and
sometimes its kin) work in concert
towards this shared goal [8]. Put
another way, why is the living material
that we call an organism packaged
into units of common purpose [9]?
The modern answer to this problem is:
natural selection leads to organisms
that appear designed for a single
purpose, that purpose being
maximization of their inclusive
fitness [10,11].
Queller and Strassmann [2] turn this
around, arguing that it is exactly this
shared purpose that defines an
organism. Specifically, something is
an organism if the parts work together
for the integrated whole, with high
cooperation and low conflict. This
means the organism is the largest
unit of near-unanimous design. The
‘near’ is required because there can
always be some conflict, even within
the strongest examples of organisms,
such as genetic conflicts within
animals.
Given this argument, it then becomes
possible to assess where any living
thing stands on a scale of
‘organismality’, by considering two
variables: the extent of cooperation,
and the extent of conflict (Figure 1) [2].
Organisms are defined by when
cooperation is high and conflict low.
If both cooperation and conflict are
high we have societies. If both conflict
and cooperation are low we have
simple groups. If cooperation is low
and conflict is high we have
competitors. Whilst it may be hard
to accurately place specific cases
on the scale, the elegance of this
classification is that it is conceptually
clear and simple. Where things fall on
this two-dimensional continuum can be
explored at several levels, and this is
when things start to get fun (Figure 2).
Consider groups of cells (Figure 1A).
In animals such as mammals, each
individual cell develops from a single
fertilised cell, leading to genetic
uniformity, with minimal conflict and
high cooperation. This is clearly an
organism. However, mutation can bringconflict, such as cancerous growths.
The potential for such mutations will
be greater in larger, many-celled
animals, leading to increased potential
for conflict. A whale is therefore less
of an organism than a mouse. In the
Tasmanian devil, a fatal facial cancer
is transmissible, increasing internal
conflict, making them even less of
an organism. Likewise, even some
forms of cancer can be passed from
mother to developing foetus [12]. In
marmosets, cells mix between fraternal
twins while in the uterus, also reducing
organismicity [13]. So while they are
at an extreme end of the organism
continuum, not all animals are
‘organismicly’ equal.
Things get much more variable when
considering other taxa such as plants,
algae and bacteria. A particularly
interesting example is provided by
Dictyostelium slime moulds. These
normally live unicellular lives in the
soil, feeding on amobae; no one
would think to call such a group of cells
an organism. However, when times are
tough, cells come together to form a
fruiting body, with approximately a
quarter of the cells sacrificing their
lives to become the stalk cells that
help spores disperse (Figure 2). How
organismal is this fruiting body? The
high cooperation and low conflict
within the fruiting body, a result of high
mean relatedness [14], suggests it
should fall relatively high on the
organismality scale. This means that
groups of slime mould cells can be an
organism, but perhaps only at certain
stages of their life cycle! A remarkable
range of cooperative behaviours are
being identified in what are normally
considered single celled organisms,
such as bacteria and protozoa [15],
providing other examples of possible
organismality.
Now,considergroupsofmulti-cellular
individuals (Figure 1B). In cases where
the individuals all work together for a
single purpose, they would be defined
as organisms. A clear example is in the
Portugesemano’war, a jelly-likemarine
invertebrate, where clones bud and can
have specialised function within the
colony. Similarly, within colonies of
social insects, such as the honeybee
or leaf cutter ants, there is low conflict
and high cooperation, with individuals
having specialised functions. These
are sometimes referred to as
superorganisms, but why not just call
them organisms? From an adaptive
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Figure 1. Queller and Strassmann’s [2] two-dimensional measure of organismality.
Shown are examples for groups of cells (A) and groups of multi-cellular individuals (B). Higher
cooperation and lower conflict leads to greater organismality [2]. (Figure provided by David
Queller; reproduced with permission from [2].)
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R1081perspective, a colony of social insects
is analogous to the colony of cells that
comprise a human.
Sexual partners are not usually
thought of as an organism, with much
reason. For example, bed bug males
cause considerable harm to their mates
when they violently pierce their body
wall to inseminate them. Under this
new classification, however, some
sexual partnerships can be considered
more organismal than others. In
species such as albatrosses or dik-diks
(a small African antelope), individuals
mate for life, leading to low conflict
and high cooperation, placing the
pairs of animals appreciably up the
organismality scale. An even more
extreme example is provided by the
species of anglerfish where the male
fuses onto the female and basically
becomes a ball sack. Queller and
Strassmann [2] point out that while
this relationship is often called
parasitic, it makes much more sense
to think of it as an organism, as the
pair are essentially a single unit with
a common goal.
Is there a danger that the term
organism will be over-used? For
instance, one could argue that all
things clonal could now be classified as
an organism. Dandelions are clonal,
sharing both contiguity and genetic
identify, but how do they rank on the
organismality scale? Again, Queller and
Strassmann’s [2] classification system
is quite pragmatic. They propose that
dandelion clones are not highly
organismal because members do not
show high levels of cooperation.
Consequently, members of a dandelion
clone may be better viewed as direct
competitors than organisms. Similarly,
consider groups of animals such as
shoals of fish: whilst there can be
cooperation to avoid predators, there
is still the potential for much conflict,
and this prevents them scoring high
on the organismality scale.
Finally,wecanconsidermulti-species
groups. It is now accepted that the
mitochondria in eukaryotic cells
originated via the incorporation of a
bacterium. We have no trouble thinking
of eukaryotic cells as an organism, or
multicellular groups of such cells being
an organism. Given this, it is only a
small step further to consider other
mutualistic associations, such as the
Buchnera bacteria in the guts of aphids
or the algae that provide carbon to
lichens, as organismal, as they too are
characterised by high cooperation and
Figure 2. What is an organism?
The human is clearly an organism. The horse was an organism. But what about the bacteria
now growing in the horse, the slime mould fruiting body on the horse’s faeces, or the clumps
of plants growing in the background? (Photos provided by Marshall Burke and Owen Gilbert.)
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mutualisms with more ongoing conflict,
such as cleaner fish mutualisms [16]
or pollination mutualisms, are ranked
considerably lower on the organismality
scale. Close physical proximity is not,
however, a defining characteristic.
In some situations, even in those
mutualisms that are not physically
cohesive, for example legume–rhizobia
interactions, conflict is largely
controlled [17], thereby increasing the
organismality of the mutualism.
At this stage, it is useful to ask: why
we should care? We can put things on
a cooperation and conflict scale and
say how organismal they are, but does
this really matter? Many will not care,
and it is unlikely to change what most
biologists are doing on a day to day
basis; however, the elegance of Queller
and Strasmann’s [2] classification
is that it generalises from basic
evolutionary principles to all levels of
biological diversity. It is not biased
to certain taxa, or to certain
preconceptions. It basically says
natural selection does this, and this
will lead to things which we can call
organisms.
Queller and Strassmann’s [2]
classification is not black and white,
but neither are all organisms. Maynard
Smith and Szathamry’s [7] work on themajor transitions emphasised the
importance of rare events of great
importance. Queller and Strassmann
[2] build upon this, emphasising the
gradual steps along the way. By
focusing on an adaptive perspective,
Queller and Strassmann’s [2] approach
is also closely linked with the
theoretical formalisation of Darwin’s
theory of natural selection [18].
Recent theoretical work has addressed
the related question of defining the
conditions under which individuals
can be selected to behave as if they
are adapted to maximise the
reproductive success of their group [9].
The answer is when there is no
conflict within the group, which can
occur due to high relatedness or
repression of competition [9]. Queller
and Strassmann’s [2] approach
emphasises that while reduced conflict
can pave the way to organismality,
it is only reached if there is also
selection for high cooperation.
We would respond to the questions
posed two paragraphs ago with the
answer that yes we should care, and
yes it does matters. The concept of
the organism is fundamental to the
study of adaptation [8]. By putting
adaptation back into the concept of
the organism, a firm evolutionary
footing is provided to the organismconcept, and a slew of interesting
questions are raised [2,9]. Whilst it
could be useful to have multiple
definitions of the organism concept,
the sooner that the adaptationist
approach finds its way into text
books, the better.
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